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Author: Chris Pacia
Date:  
To: System undo crew
Subject: Re: [unSYSTEM] DarkWallet Complexity explosion
I tend to disagree that re-use avoidance (if done correctly) adds
complexity for the user.

Consider that the UI doesn't even need to show the bitcoin addresses in the
wallet. All the user needs to know is that she has a "wallet".

The wallet seed is just as easy to secure as a private key and a stealth
address is just as easy to share with others as a regular address.

(I'm assuming we can come up with a standard approach to deriving a stealth
address from the seed)
On Feb 17, 2014 12:17 AM, "Troy Benjegerdes" <hozer@???> wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 20, 2013 at 11:32:57AM -0600, Taylor Gerring wrote:
> > I'm inclined to agree, as this was discussed on multiple occasions and
> seems to fix a lot of the address re-use problems. With hot topics like
> "coin validation", I think it's important to highlight the privacy that
> generating fresh addresses from public extended keys grants us.
> >
>
> Assumptions: (please bear with me)
>
> 1) Complexity favors government-level attackers
>
> 2) Most users value free stuff over privacy/anonymity/etc
>
> 3) address-re-use DECREASES complexity, and aids debugging and transparency
>
> 4) address-re-use avoidance, coinjoin, etc, etc are a combinatorial
> complexity
>    explosiof of epic proportions, with an infinite attack surface

>
>
> Conclusion: You are doing it wrong, and making it trivial for government
> attackers to subvert the *design process*, and trying to make it impossible
> for me to perform the kind of public and transparent network forensics
> that might expose sophisticated attacks.[1]
>
> [1]
> http://www.reddit.com/r/catcoins/comments/1y2eg6/aye_maties_raise_the_jib_and_ready_the_checkpoint/
> (scroll down to 'insurance policy')
>
> When a users's Darkwallet is hacked, and the money anonymously spread
> around,
> who do you think is going to get it? The 'good guys', or the guys who are
> anonymously buying control of the system and propganda machines?
>
> Whatever I do, the bad guy is going to be able to outspend me, outsmart,
> and outforce me.
>
> I can do one thing better. Keep it simple, and easy to explain to both
> persons and computers.
>
> Simple is this: Code is speech, money is code, and I have a
> constitutionally
> protected right to speak money, bear cryptographic keys, and a right to
> trial
> by jury of my peers.
>
> All this talk of more code reeks of an attempt by the government to force
> me
> to provide quarter to code-soldiers hidden in the complexity jungle.
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