On Fri, Dec 20, 2013 at 11:32:57AM -0600, Taylor Gerring wrote:
> I’m inclined to agree, as this was discussed on multiple occasions and seems to fix a lot of the address re-use problems. With hot topics like “coin validation”, I think it’s important to highlight the privacy that generating fresh addresses from public extended keys grants us.
>

Assumptions: (please bear with me)

1) Complexity favors government-level attackers

2) Most users value free stuff over privacy/anonymity/etc

3) address-re-use DECREASES complexity, and aids debugging and transparency

4) address-re-use avoidance, coinjoin, etc, etc are a combinatorial complexity
explosiof of epic proportions, with an infinite attack surface


Conclusion: You are doing it wrong, and making it trivial for government
attackers to subvert the *design process*, and trying to make it impossible
for me to perform the kind of public and transparent network forensics
that might expose sophisticated attacks.[1]

[1] http://www.reddit.com/r/catcoins/comments/1y2eg6/aye_maties_raise_the_jib_and_ready_the_checkpoint/
(scroll down to 'insurance policy')

When a users's Darkwallet is hacked, and the money anonymously spread around,
who do you think is going to get it? The 'good guys', or the guys who are
anonymously buying control of the system and propganda machines?

Whatever I do, the bad guy is going to be able to outspend me, outsmart,
and outforce me.

I can do one thing better. Keep it simple, and easy to explain to both
persons and computers.

Simple is this: Code is speech, money is code, and I have a constitutionally
protected right to speak money, bear cryptographic keys, and a right to trial
by jury of my peers.

All this talk of more code reeks of an attempt by the government to force me
to provide quarter to code-soldiers hidden in the complexity jungle.