:: Re: [unSYSTEM] ZeroCash - zero know…
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Auteur: Kristov Atlas
Date:  
À: System undo crew
Sujet: Re: [unSYSTEM] ZeroCash - zero knowledge proof, seems promising
Since there is generally a one-to-one relationship between pubkeys and
addresses, I would assume that there would be a ring address that is
derived from the ring pubkey that will act as an input. I'm not sure,
though. Shouldn't be too long before the next DarkSend version comes out.

-K

On 05/19/2014 09:21 PM, Chris Pacia wrote:
> Darkcoin still uses inputs and outputs though right? Where does the
> ring come in, at signing? How do it stop guarantee the facilitator
> can't map inputs with outputs?
>
>
> On 05/19/2014 08:57 PM, Kristov Atlas wrote:
>> You join a group of people (ring) and share pubkeys, forming an
>> aggregate ring pubkey. The crypto works so that others can confirm
>> that a tx was signed with the appropriate privkey to spend, but they
>> won't be able to tell which party in the ring signed it. I imagine
>> this could work ad hoc using another party to orchestrate (e.g.
>> obelisk server) or it could be arranged ahead of time and be
>> performed asynchronously. All the parties need to do is exchange
>> pubkeys, they don't need to continue signing each tx in the future.
>> I'm not sure on this, but it may be even possible to scale that ring
>> up to the size of all users of a crypto-currency willing to
>> pre-publish their pubkey.
>>
>> More details: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ring_signature
>>
>> I talked about this in the most recent episode of Dark News
>> (timestamp in the video description):
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s1oGuJv-Mbs
>>
>> -Kristov
>>
>> On 05/19/2014 08:44 PM, Chris Pacia wrote:
>>> How do the ring signatures work in practice? Does it still require
>>> connecting to server sending the outputs,
>>> disconnecting/reconnecting, sending the inputs to remain private? Or
>>> can you just upload one chunk of data to the server?
>>>
>>> On 05/19/2014 05:00 PM, Kristov Atlas wrote:
>>>> A multi party protocol for distributing the responsibility of
>>>> generating that entropy might help.
>>>>
>>>> Right now I'm more excited about the ring signature tech going into
>>>> the next version of Darkcoin's DarkSend. What do people think about
>>>> ring signatures?
>>>>
>>>> -Kristov Atlas
>>>>
>>>> On May 19, 2014, at 13:04, Thomas Hartman
>>>> <thomas@??? <mailto:thomas@standardcrypto.com>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> You have to trust whoever generates the entropy for super duper
>>>>> private key as a one time thing. Otherwise the key owner can steal
>>>>> coins.
>>>>>
>>>>> Seems like a showstopper to me.
>>>>>
>>>>> Maybe doable with side chains, so if any one chain is compromised
>>>>> the other chains can still work.
>>>>>
>>>>> But we don't have side chains.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, it's very proof of concept and maybe in the future.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 9:16 AM, Amir Taaki <genjix@???
>>>>> <mailto:genjix@riseup.net>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>     http://zerocash-project.org/media/pdf/zerocash-extended-20140518.pdf

>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
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