can obviate sacrificing to miners fees by sacrificing to a demonstrably made up bitcoin address which doesn't have a corresponding private key (akin to counterparty's burn)

On 19 May 2014, at 15:39, Robert Williamson <bobalot@???> wrote:

> Doesn't op return outputs need to have a value of 0?
>
> There's other concerns too. If we count someone as trustworthy because they have sacrificed some amount of money to fees, its easy for mining pools to start creating identities where a lot of fees are sacrificed to themselves.
>
> On 19 May 2014 15:06, "Peter Todd" <pete@???> wrote:
> > Actually I proposed that idea first, calling it a fidelity bond, and came up with the secure way to sacrifice to fees, announce-commit sacrifices. (Mike is leaving out a lot of details)
>
> That said sacrifice to fees encourages mining centralisation, so I highly recommend that bitcoins be destroyed instead in an OP_RETURN txout.
>
>
>
> On 19 May 2014 15:47:28 CEST, Drak <drak@???> wrote:
> >You should check out Proof-of-Sacrifice as first proposed by Mike
> >Hearn in https://medium.com/bitcoin-talk/d3f9f299f729 - it's worth
> >reading.
> >
> >On 19 May 2014 11:56, Liad Shababo <liad@???> wrote:
> >> Have been riffing on this idea for a bit. Would appreciate
> >thoughts/feedback
> >>
> >> Problem:
> >>
> >> Continued growth of the sharing economy and p2p marketplaces
> >necessitates a
> >> global distributed and repurposable (real
> >name/pseudonymous/anonymous) trust
> >> and reputation system. A mechanism is needed which will allow
> >strangers to
> >> gauge whether to interact/transact with each other across 'n'
> >services and
> >> use-cases. Trusted Identities would engender trade, relationships,
> >> serendipity and more.
> >>
> >> A possible solution:
> >>
> >> Proof of burn represents a sacrifice of value in order to establish a
> >> trusted identity. By making a trusted identity expensive to obtain it
> >can be
> >> trusted not to engage in bad behaviour, as doing so would cause the
> >identity
> >> to become destroyed if tarnished thereby rendering the sacrifice and
> >> identity useless.
> >>
> >> Third parties can easily verify the value sacrificed to establish
> >your
> >> trusted identity and use it as a proxy to decide whether to:
> >>
> >> 1) rent their room to you on Airbnb
> >>
> >> 2) go on a date with you after meeting you on Tinder
> >>
> >> 3) accept you for a ride on Lyft
> >>
> >> 4) back your projects on Kickstarter
> >>
> >> 5) loan you money through crowdlending
> >>
> >> etc etc.
> >>
> >> MVP:
> >>
> >> A web app which generates a verifiably unspendable bitcoin address
> >to which
> >> you would send an arbitrary amount of btc (proof of burn). The
> >service would
> >> then link the transaction hash of the payment to an existing online
> >identity
> >> of your choosing and provide you a profile page which acts as public
> >proof
> >> of your trusted identity.
> >>
> >>
> >> In the event of bad behaviour, aggrieved parties can leave public
> >comments
> >> on your proof page for others to see. The service itself would not
> >blacklist
> >> your identity based on negative feedback, merely display it for
> >others to
> >> judge as they see fit. (Third party services could create blacklists
> >off the
> >> data much in the same way SpamAssassin and others do to IP
> >addresses). Over
> >> time we create a global trust network
> >>
> >>
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> >>
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