Doesn't op return outputs need to have a value of 0?

There's other concerns too. If we count someone as trustworthy because they
have sacrificed some amount of money to fees, its easy for mining pools to
start creating identities where a lot of fees are sacrificed to themselves.
On 19 May 2014 15:06, "Peter Todd" <pete@???> wrote:

> > Actually I proposed that idea first, calling it a fidelity bond, and came
> up with the secure way to sacrifice to fees, announce-commit sacrifices.
> (Mike is leaving out a lot of details)
>
> That said sacrifice to fees encourages mining centralisation, so I highly
> recommend that bitcoins be destroyed instead in an OP_RETURN txout.
>
>
>
> On 19 May 2014 15:47:28 CEST, Drak <drak@???> wrote:
> >You should check out Proof-of-Sacrifice as first proposed by Mike
> >Hearn in https://medium.com/bitcoin-talk/d3f9f299f729 - it's worth
> >reading.
> >
> >On 19 May 2014 11:56, Liad Shababo <liad@???> wrote:
> >> Have been riffing on this idea for a bit. Would appreciate
> >thoughts/feedback
> >>
> >> Problem:
> >>
> >> Continued growth of the sharing economy and p2p marketplaces
> >necessitates a
> >> global distributed and repurposable (real
> >name/pseudonymous/anonymous) trust
> >> and reputation system. A mechanism is needed which will allow
> >strangers to
> >> gauge whether to interact/transact with each other across 'n'
> >services and
> >> use-cases. Trusted Identities would engender trade, relationships,
> >> serendipity and more.
> >>
> >> A possible solution:
> >>
> >> Proof of burn represents a sacrifice of value in order to establish a
> >> trusted identity. By making a trusted identity expensive to obtain it
> >can be
> >> trusted not to engage in bad behaviour, as doing so would cause the
> >identity
> >> to become destroyed if tarnished thereby rendering the sacrifice and
> >> identity useless.
> >>
> >> Third parties can easily verify the value sacrificed to establish
> >your
> >> trusted identity and use it as a proxy to decide whether to:
> >>
> >> 1) rent their room to you on Airbnb
> >>
> >> 2) go on a date with you after meeting you on Tinder
> >>
> >> 3) accept you for a ride on Lyft
> >>
> >> 4) back your projects on Kickstarter
> >>
> >> 5) loan you money through crowdlending
> >>
> >> etc etc.
> >>
> >> MVP:
> >>
> >> A web app which generates a verifiably unspendable bitcoin address
> >to which
> >> you would send an arbitrary amount of btc (proof of burn). The
> >service would
> >> then link the transaction hash of the payment to an existing online
> >identity
> >> of your choosing and provide you a profile page which acts as public
> >proof
> >> of your trusted identity.
> >>
> >>
> >> In the event of bad behaviour, aggrieved parties can leave public
> >comments
> >> on your proof page for others to see. The service itself would not
> >blacklist
> >> your identity based on negative feedback, merely display it for
> >others to
> >> judge as they see fit. (Third party services could create blacklists
> >off the
> >> data much in the same way SpamAssassin and others do to IP
> >addresses). Over
> >> time we create a global trust network
> >>
> >>
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> >>
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