I really like the concept of proof-of-burn, especially with gradients (a
continuous gradient may work fine as well). I see it as another
implementation of signaling theory used throughout history to convey
trustworthiness ( costly degree, expensive clothes, lavish architecture,
etc.).

Essentially it's an up-front investment in a reputation and therefore is
likely only viable along side a system for establishing and acknowledging
reputation.

I'd propose exploring a reputation system that aggregates successful
transactions with several pseudonyms, giving a premium to transactions with
high value pseudonyms and discounting repeat transactions. Adjusting the
weights of the premiums and discounts should be open to experimentation.
Perhaps a marketplace for various reputation algorithms could best sort out
the right approach. Scholarship on this topic may already be out there too.
I haven't exactly done an extensive literature review.


This lecture really helped me see the historical value of signaling in
emergent contract enforcement and it's important relationship with
reputation ( signaling discussion starts at 47:10 )

http://youtu.be/Ez5-Gqi5bBQ?t=47m10s



Jonathan Vaage
https://www.onename.io/jonvaage


On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 10:18 AM, Washington Sanchez <
washington.sanchez@???> wrote:

> Also something else I suggested:
>
> Another proposal: gradient prices for pseudonyms?
> Pseudonyms
>

>    1. Gold class - 1 BTC
>    2. Silver class - 0.5 BTC
>    3. Bronze class - 0.1 BTC
>    4. Iron class - 0.01 BTC
>    5. Tin class - 0.001 BTC

>
> If I want to purchase a good worth 0.3 BTC, I would think twice before
> entering into an exchange with an Iron or Tin-class pseudonym. On the other
> hand, if I only intend to make small scale purchases, I don't need to buy
> any more than an Iron class pseudonym.
>
>
> On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 1:17 AM, Washington Sanchez <
> washington.sanchez@???> wrote:
>
>> No problem. Like I wrote elsewhere in that discussion, we would want a
>> situation where we avoid depending on one system to manage risk in
>> pseudonymous trade over OpenBazaar:
>>
>> How do you enforce a contract? How do you prove a package was sent or
>> received?
>>
>> Until we have delivery drones that sign multi-sig transactions, we will
>> always have an imperfect solution! However, I think there is some exciting
>> room for *merchants law* regarding judgments for disputes.
>>
>> For example, if the seller is able to provide a tracking number, or
>> photo/video proof to the arbiter that the package was indeed loaded with
>> the goods and sent to the specified address, then this qualifies as an
>> automatic ruling that:
>>

>>    1. The seller's surety bond cannot be broken
>>    2. In the absence of the buyer providing proof, beyond reasonable
>>    doubt, that the goods weren't delivered, funds will be transferred to the
>>    seller.

>>
>> Various arbitration guidelines, organisations can specify what qualities
>> as *reasonable proof* for various categories of goods/services.
>> Obviously the *reasonable proof* required for a chair will be different
>> to a good is banned by an oppressive government that may land you in
>> serious legal trouble (e.g. Bibles in North Korea).
>>
>> A web of trust doesn't enforce a contract, but it does make you lose your
>> valued trust when you defraud something. At the same time, a WoT identity
>> is free, and doesn't allow you to (directly) buy reputation.
>>
>> Web of trust is vulnerable to the long con. I don't want to *only* put
>> my faith in a web of trust using large amount of funds. Rather, I would
>> prefer to trust in a combination of:
>>

>>    1. An identity that the pseudonym has purchased for a
>>    non-insignificant sum via proof of burn
>>    2. Surety bond partially or equal to the value of the good I wish to
>>    purchase/sell
>>    3. Track record of surety bond breakages (or lack thereof)
>>    4. Reputation, WoT, and reviews
>>    5. Insurance that I purchase on my part

>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 6:15 PM, caedes <caedes@???> wrote:
>>
>>> On 16/05/14 03:26, Washington Sanchez wrote:
>>>
>>> There's been a lengthy discussion on reputation systems for pseudonymous
>>> marketplaces here:
>>>
>>> https://github.com/OpenBazaar/OpenBazaar/issues/9#issuecomment-43251990
>>>
>>> Of course you can't discuss this whole subject without bringing up
>>> Justus Ranvier's *Lex Cryptographia* (
>>> http://bitcoinism.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/lex-cryptographia.html)
>>>
>>> Taking a page from his article, I made the attached suggestion.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Btw, read your suggestion and sounds very reasonable... maybe you can
>>> paste in text format so it can be documented better?
>>>
>>> Anyways I see the reputation and trust is something you attach to
>>> identities so I don't see much problem in adding as much proof as you want
>>> as long as the system is flexible and developers are diligent.
>>>
>>> kisses!
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> unSYSTEM mailing list: http://unsystem.net
>>> https://mailinglists.dyne.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/unsystem
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> -------------------------------------------
>> *Dr Washington Y. Sanchez*
>> Post-doctoral research officer
>> Therapeutics Research Centre
>> University of Queensland
>> Princess Alexandra Hospital
>> Woollongabba, 4102
>> Queensland, Australia
>>
>
>
>
> --
> -------------------------------------------
> *Dr Washington Y. Sanchez*
> Post-doctoral research officer
> Therapeutics Research Centre
> University of Queensland
> Princess Alexandra Hospital
> Woollongabba, 4102
> Queensland, Australia
>
> _______________________________________________
> unSYSTEM mailing list: http://unsystem.net
> https://mailinglists.dyne.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/unsystem
>
>