:: Re: [unSYSTEM] Bitlaw in Dark Walle…
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Autor: Mario Jefferson
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Dla: System undo crew
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Temat: Re: [unSYSTEM] Bitlaw in Dark Wallet, where we want to go...
Great idea Adam. You think as I do. I also have been kicking around these kinds of ideas IMO this platform basically boiled down to a massive conversation platform whereby users of this platform could, by way user managed meta data ie personal block chain and 'file' in on a conversation. Guilds could form whereby schools of particular thought regarding the issue can way in and persons could vote. Pretty much as you listed the only kicker IMO is the. GUI a real time visualizer that sorts out everything smartly. What do you thinkSent using CloudMagicOn Sun, May 11, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Amir Taaki <genjix@???> wrote: https://wiki.unsystem.net/index.php/BitlawOn 10/05/14 18:39, Adam B. Levine wrote:> Hey all,> I've been spinning on this concept recently and thought it would be a> good conversation with this group.> > labs.humint.is/politik/ <http://labs.humint.is/politik/>> > *An Accountable Representative Decision Making & Leadership System*> > by Adam B. Levine <http://twitter.com/gamerandy>> > When we talk about Bitcoin or cryptocurrency, it is usually in the> context of money. Sometimes it is in the form of stake, but this stake> is usually acquired through some work or for funds donated. Politik is a> system which recasts the metaphor of token from Coin to Voice - the> ability to influence an outcome by making your “voice” heard.> > This contrasts with the systems of the world today, voting is a process> of the very slightly larger group getting their way while the smaller> group does not. These “groups” as individuals are not represented at> all, the one time they interact with their representative is during> their periodic election. Once in office, they have the power to do as> they will in the name of representing those constituents and the only> alternative is the most-extreme recall election which even if successful> only returns a different person to the same predictable predicament.> > The problem is no accountability, voters are locked in once the decision> is made. This made sense in the days of horseback travel, but in a> post-bitcoin world this idea is preposterous. Accountability is> necessary all the time, and applying the metaphors and tools of Bitcoin> we can achieve it.> > Imagine a cryptocurrency wallet that contains bitcoins, other> cryptocurrencies and a category of tokens called (poli)”Tiks” - For each> elected position you normally vote for, you have a purpose specific tik.> You can send these but they will return to the original owner after a> pre-set period of time. This is user-defined, the default would probably> be 2 years.> > There is also a “panic button” that recalls a specific tik if the person> imbued with it is doing something you find so onerous you want to pull> your support from them completely.> > When laws are being voted on or decisions made, representatives send> their own coin to the bill, either for or against and the weight of all> the constituents tokens represent the total weight of the> representatives vote. Unlike constituent tokens the default would be> less than an hour, just long enough to validate and provide an anti-spam> mechanism against legislating too fast.> > This effect of tiks in a constituents wallet “weighting” their own tik> does not just have to be one layer deep. If I don’t follow national> politics but my friend Bob does and we generally agree, I can send my> tik to Bob and then when he sends his tik to the Anthony, (the candidate> he thinks is most valuable to support) Bobs vote is worth the same as if> Anthony had sent his and I had also sent mine, except I just got to> automatically do what Bob did.> > Bob might not know himself, he could give it to his favorite political> pundit who then would have more power with candidates since they> literally represent the voice of their listeners.> > For constituents this is very simple, they send their tiks as they see> fit and can forget about them. If the representative steps out of line> enough for the constituents to realize it, all they have to do is press> the panic button and it actually reduces the power of the out-of-line> representative.> > That voice freshly in the possession of enraged constituents can then> find its way to a different representative who is more accurately> adhering to whatever principle their own rep is not. This can result in> lasting gains for that representative as the new supporters might not> take the pro-active step of returning it to the offending rep.> > Similarly, if I have placed my tik with a political pundit or my friend> and they do not withdraw their own token in support, I can choose to> withdraw my token from them which has the impact of reducing their power> as well.> > The natural incentive in this situation will be for unpopular positions> to be abandoned at all levels of the structure because the longer you> wait, the more constituents will leave many of whom will not return> > This also removes the need for “recall” elections, representatives who> alienate their constituents will find their votes still being recorded> but not carrying any weight in the decision. They will render themselves> irrelevant. If the new representatives imbued with power become bad> actors, it will vacate their vessel just as quickly.> > > > > _______________________________________________> unSYSTEM mailing list: http://unsystem.net> https://mailinglists.dyne.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/unsystem>