:: [unSYSTEM] Bitlaw in Dark Wallet, w…
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Szerző: Amir Taaki
Dátum:  
Címzett: unsystem
Régi témák: [unSYSTEM] Rethinking cryptocurrency as accountable distributed decisionmaking
Tárgy: [unSYSTEM] Bitlaw in Dark Wallet, where we want to go...
https://wiki.unsystem.net/index.php/Bitlaw

On 10/05/14 18:39, Adam B. Levine wrote:
> Hey all,
> I've been spinning on this concept recently and thought it would be a
> good conversation with this group.
>
> labs.humint.is/politik/ <http://labs.humint.is/politik/>
>
> *An Accountable Representative Decision Making & Leadership System*
>
> by Adam B. Levine <http://twitter.com/gamerandy>
>
> When we talk about Bitcoin or cryptocurrency, it is usually in the
> context of money. Sometimes it is in the form of stake, but this stake
> is usually acquired through some work or for funds donated. Politik is a
> system which recasts the metaphor of token from Coin to Voice - the
> ability to influence an outcome by making your “voice” heard.
>
> This contrasts with the systems of the world today, voting is a process
> of the very slightly larger group getting their way while the smaller
> group does not. These “groups” as individuals are not represented at
> all, the one time they interact with their representative is during
> their periodic election. Once in office, they have the power to do as
> they will in the name of representing those constituents and the only
> alternative is the most-extreme recall election which even if successful
> only returns a different person to the same predictable predicament.
>
> The problem is no accountability, voters are locked in once the decision
> is made. This made sense in the days of horseback travel, but in a
> post-bitcoin world this idea is preposterous. Accountability is
> necessary all the time, and applying the metaphors and tools of Bitcoin
> we can achieve it.
>
> Imagine a cryptocurrency wallet that contains bitcoins, other
> cryptocurrencies and a category of tokens called (poli)”Tiks” - For each
> elected position you normally vote for, you have a purpose specific tik.
> You can send these but they will return to the original owner after a
> pre-set period of time. This is user-defined, the default would probably
> be 2 years.
>
> There is also a “panic button” that recalls a specific tik if the person
> imbued with it is doing something you find so onerous you want to pull
> your support from them completely.
>
> When laws are being voted on or decisions made, representatives send
> their own coin to the bill, either for or against and the weight of all
> the constituents tokens represent the total weight of the
> representatives vote. Unlike constituent tokens the default would be
> less than an hour, just long enough to validate and provide an anti-spam
> mechanism against legislating too fast.
>
> This effect of tiks in a constituents wallet “weighting” their own tik
> does not just have to be one layer deep. If I don’t follow national
> politics but my friend Bob does and we generally agree, I can send my
> tik to Bob and then when he sends his tik to the Anthony, (the candidate
> he thinks is most valuable to support) Bobs vote is worth the same as if
> Anthony had sent his and I had also sent mine, except I just got to
> automatically do what Bob did.
>
> Bob might not know himself, he could give it to his favorite political
> pundit who then would have more power with candidates since they
> literally represent the voice of their listeners.
>
> For constituents this is very simple, they send their tiks as they see
> fit and can forget about them. If the representative steps out of line
> enough for the constituents to realize it, all they have to do is press
> the panic button and it actually reduces the power of the out-of-line
> representative.
>
> That voice freshly in the possession of enraged constituents can then
> find its way to a different representative who is more accurately
> adhering to whatever principle their own rep is not. This can result in
> lasting gains for that representative as the new supporters might not
> take the pro-active step of returning it to the offending rep.
>
> Similarly, if I have placed my tik with a political pundit or my friend
> and they do not withdraw their own token in support, I can choose to
> withdraw my token from them which has the impact of reducing their power
> as well.
>
> The natural incentive in this situation will be for unpopular positions
> to be abandoned at all levels of the structure because the longer you
> wait, the more constituents will leave many of whom will not return
>
> This also removes the need for “recall” elections, representatives who
> alienate their constituents will find their votes still being recorded
> but not carrying any weight in the decision. They will render themselves
> irrelevant. If the new representatives imbued with power become bad
> actors, it will vacate their vessel just as quickly.
>
>
>
>
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