Here's a pretty nice review of various SSL libraries.
http://tstarling.com/blog/2014/04/ssl-implementations-compared/

I tend to agree with him, sadly, if you need SSL probably your only
option is running a little Java proxy in front of your webserver.

Note that this is the fault of the SSL specification too, they created
what is effectively a Ping message, nested inside of a generic SSL
message and they added a duplicated length field. Cjdns also contains
variable length ping messages, there is no ambiguity because they get
their length from their container.

In cjdns, all data which comes in from the world is immediately placed
into Message structures which are effectively grow-down stacks, they
have a length, a pointer to the head of the stack and a "padding"
number which represents how far the stack can grow. Accesses to the
data in this stack are through push and pop functions which contain
bounds checks.
https://github.com/cjdelisle/cjdns/blob/crashey/wire/Message.h
A good example of this is in the DNS message parser where every read
and every write is managed by Message_pop() and Message_push().
https://github.com/cjdelisle/cjdns/blob/crashey/interface/DNSServer.c

I'm not totally tooting my own horn here, my biggest point is to ask
how can something that I managed to get more or less right be so
completely screwed up by all of the big players?!


Thanks,
Caleb


On 04/14/2014 05:53 PM, Troy Benjegerdes wrote:
> The best part was the 'update your bitcoinz, because someone can steal
> them if you use the completely unncecssary openssl payment protocol'.
> Fortunately many altcoins have been saved by sheer laziness of not
> updating to the latest pre-hacked version.
>
> So does Theo have a decent SSL implementation in OpenBSD? Is gnutls any
> good?
>
> On Fri, Apr 11, 2014 at 10:07:34AM +0200, Caleb James DeLisle wrote:
>> Heartbleed reads up to 64k of memory, crossing 16 page boundaries
>> into "unallocated space" but it never triggers a segfault even
>> on systems with hardened malloc().
>>
>> Theo de Raadt comments on OpenSSL's bypass of the OpenBSD secure malloc()
>> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.os.openbsd.misc/211963
>>
>> And more about exactly how it works:
>> http://www.tedunangst.com/flak/post/heartbleed-vs-mallocconf
>>
>> And why it's impossible to turn it off:
>> http://www.tedunangst.com/flak/post/analysis-of-openssl-freelist-reuse
>>
>>
>> A missed bounds check is an accident, a pattern of insecure design
>> practices is a scandal.
>>
>>
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>