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Συντάκτης: Vitalik Buterin
Ημερομηνία:  
Προς: System undo crew
Αντικείμενο: Re: [unSYSTEM] Tonight's Bitcoin: Discrimination of Coloured Coins [VIDEO]
Unfortunately, blockchain.info has banned me due to too many IP requests. I
intend to switch the pushing and history to some SX setup, the main problem
is making it responsive and consistent. I'm actually thinking of making
node-sx maintain its own local txpool and utxo/stxo pool, but the ideal
solution would be to work with the SX full nodes directly as a
blockchain.info replacement. I'll make an update once I have a good
solution.


On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 4:41 PM, Vitalik Buterin <vbuterin@???> wrote:

> Here you go, ya luddites.
>
> http://46.4.92.107:3189/
>
> Online Google Authenticator interface, so you don't need a phone anymore.
>
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 4:04 PM, Amir Taaki <genjix@???> wrote:
>
>>
>> I'm blind:
>>
>> https://github.com/tadeck/onetimepass
>>
>> On 13/09/13 16:00, Amir Taaki wrote:
>> > Is there an opensource version of Google Auth?
>> >
>> > "Subsequent versions contain Google-specific workflows that are
>> > not part of the project."
>> >
>> > Sounds really sketchy.
>> >
>> > On 13/09/13 15:56, Amir Taaki wrote:
>> >> I haven't been able to test (no mobile phone). Is this a tool for
>> >> having a wallet that is backed up but without trusting the
>> >> person backing up the wallet?
>> >
>> >> On 13/09/13 07:30, Vitalik Buterin wrote:
>> >>> Great feedback, Peter!
>> >
>> >>> 1. Suppost you just got your 10 BTC month's salary in one
>> >>> transaction and you go on a shopping spree. On the first day,
>> >>> you buy a new keyboard for 0.5 BTC, and send 9.5 BTC back to
>> >>> yourself in change. On the second day, you buy a chocolate bar
>> >>> for 0.03 BTC, and send one change output of 9.47 BTC to
>> >>> yourself. You then buy a sandwich for 0.05 BTC, and send a
>> >>> change output of 9.42 BTC back to yourself. However, the 0.05
>> >>> BTC payment is an unconfirmed transaction dependent on an
>> >>> unconfirmed transaction. Some Bitcoin clients register that as
>> >>> invalid, so you might be forced to awkwardly wait beside the
>> >>> merchant for five minutes for the transaction to clear. Now,
>> >>> suppose you had two 4.75 BTC outputs. Then, the chocolate bar
>> >>> would come out of the first output and the sandwich from the
>> >>> second, so everything would work fine. I haven't implemented
>> >>> this yet fully; at this point, the system would actually make a
>> >>> chain of two outputs, but if you make lots of transactions you
>> >>> will eventually have dozens of unspent outputs so everything
>> >>> should usually work fine. 2. Address 1 is myself, address 2 is
>> >>> your private key generated deterministically from your username
>> >>> and password (open up the dev console and run
>> >>> slowsha(user+":"+pass) and you see it in hex form), address 3
>> >>> is the backup the app told you to take a screenshot of or copy
>> >>> down when you created the account. Normal transactions use 1+2.
>> >>> If you lose your 2FA device, or I become evil and/or co-opted
>> >>> by the US government, then you can use 2+3 to get your money
>> >>> out. If you lose your password, you can ask me and get your
>> >>> money out with 1+3 (soon I will have an automatic system for
>> >>> doing this) 3. Thanks! Will fix. 4. Right, I suppose I will
>> >>> need to make my TOTP setup more advanced, otherwise the current
>> >>> setup is vulnerable to replay attacks. A running online
>> >>> database of used name+key pairs should do the trick. 4b. Now
>> >>> that we're thinking of security, I'm thinking of requiring the
>> >>> payment message to have a signature from your private key, to
>> >>> make the wallet secure even if SSL is absent.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 7:08 AM, Peter Todd <pete@???
>> >>> <mailto:pete@petertodd.org>> wrote:
>> >
>> >>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 01:05:05AM -0400, Peter Todd wrote:
>> >>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 01:56:33AM +0200, Vitalik Buterin
>> >>>> wrote:
>> >>>>> Exclusive preview:
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> A Google Authenticator two-factor-authentication enabled
>> >>>>> wallet
>> >>> using
>> >>>>> 2-of-3 multisig. Basically, it creates the multisig between
>> >>>>> the
>> >>> server, a
>> >>>>> private key deterministically generated from your
>> >>> username+password, and a
>> >>>>> randomly generated pair that you are instructed to save
>> >>>>> using
>> >>> some external
>> >>>>> backup mechanism that is necessary for backup in case you
>> >>>>> lose your password or your second factor.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> http://46.4.92.107:3191/
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Try and sign up, and deposit and withdraw a bitcent. I'm
>> >>> deliberately
>> >>>>> withholding any clearer explanation as a usability test;
>> >>>>> you
>> >>> should be able
>> >>>>> to figure out what's going on on your own.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Issues:
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Why does it always create two change outputs?
>> >>>>
>> >>>> What exactly are the three addresses in the 2-of-3 for?
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Needs to calculate fees + give user option for how much
>> >>>> fees/KB they want to pay. Current version makes tx's that
>> >>>> will get stuck:
>> >>>> 5ca25677fcb2b385437ce4ea90cb9af1e7ee8f6ee13cc8ecd3277030c9ecabfa
>> >
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>> One more issue: you let users use the same one-time-password
>> >>> code more than once...
>> >
>> >>> -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org <http://petertodd.org>
>> >
>> >>> _______________________________________________ unSYSTEM
>> >>> mailing list: http://unsystem.net
>> >>> https://mailinglists.dyne.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/unsystem
>> >
>> >>>
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >>> _______________________________________________ unSYSTEM
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>> >
>> >>>
>> >> _______________________________________________ unSYSTEM mailing
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>> >
>> > _______________________________________________ unSYSTEM mailing
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>> >
>>
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